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Abstract: On one formulation, epistemological disjunctivism is 
the view that our perceptual beliefs constitute knowledge when 
they are based on reasons that provide them with factive support. 
Some would argue that it is impossible to understand how 
perceptual knowledge is possible unless we assume that we have 
such reasons to support our perceptual beliefs. Some would argue 
that it is impossible to understand how perceptual experience could 
furnish us with these reasons unless we assume that the traditional 
view of experience is mistaken. For reasons explained here, I think 
that the epistemological argument for metaphysical disjunctivism 
rests on mistaken assumptions about reasons and their rational role. 
Neither disjunctivist view is needed to understand how perceptual 
knowledge is possible. 
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1. Introduction 
On the formulation discussed here, epistemological disjunctivism is the view 
that in paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge, a thinker’s perceptual 
beliefs constitute knowledge when they are based on reasons that provide 
them with factive support (i.e., the complete description of the thinker’s 
reason for believing, say, that it is Agnes curled up on the sofa entails that 
Agnes is curled up on the sofa).1 A thinker is in a position to know that p 
perceptually if the thinker sees that p. It is the seeing that p that constitutes 
the thinker’s reason for believing p and provides the requisite support for 
that belief. This perceptual relation between a thinker and a fact guarantees 
that the thinker is in a position to know things about things in her 
surroundings. Without this kind of support, perceptual knowledge isn’t 
possible. 
Some philosophers accept epistemological disjunctivism because they 
think that alternative accounts of the rational basis of perceptual belief lead 
to scepticism. Some accept metaphysical disjunctivism because they think 
that this epistemological proposal requires it.2 The guiding idea seems to be 
that on the traditional view of experience (i.e., a view on which the 
experience we have in the good case is of the same fundamental kind as the 
experience we have in the bad), it wouldn’t be possible for experience to 
provide a different basis for perceptual belief in the good case and the bad. 
However, the epistemological disjunctivist proposes that in paradigmatic 
cases of perceptual knowledge, experience provides us with reasons that 
provide factive support for some perceptual beliefs about the external world. 
We cannot have such support for our beliefs in the bad case if, say, our 
perceptual beliefs are mistaken. Thus, there is a prima facie plausible line of 
argument from epistemological to metaphysical disjunctivism.3 
As someone who has, if anything, too much sympathy for naïve realism, I 
don’t have any problem with the idea that the experience we have in the 
good case might provide a kind of contact that some indistinguishable 
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experiences could not hope to provide. As someone who has just the right 
amount of sympathy for the idea that our evidence just is our knowledge 
(‘E=K’ hereafter), I have no problem with the idea that the evidence we have 
in good cases is different from and better than the evidence we have in the 
correlative bad cases. I don’t object to epistemological disjunctivism on the 
grounds that it clashes with the idea that our reasons for believing what we 
do couldn’t be better than the reasons we would have if we were BIVs, say.4 
My main concern with the disjunctivist account of perceptual knowledge 
under consideration is that it tries to account for positive epistemic standing 
in terms of the support provided by the thinker’s reasons. Our non-inferential 
beliefs do not attain positive standing because of the support provided by our 
reasons for holding these beliefs because, I have argued, there is nothing that 
is our reason for forming a non-inferential belief.5 Things go off the rails 
when we start with this mistaken claim about the rational role of the 
thinker’s reasons and then use this mistaken claim about reasons to motivate 
or justify claims about the nature of perceptual experience.6 If you think that 
these non-inferential beliefs are justified because of the support some 
thinker’s reasons for forming these beliefs provides, you have to adopt an 
account of experience on which experience is sufficiently belief-like to make 
it possible for the non-inferential beliefs to be based on reasons in much the 
same way our inferential beliefs are. Bad epistemology paves the way for 
mistakes in the philosophy of mind. 
Because I accept E=K and think that a thinker’s knowledge just is her 
evidence, I don’t think that cases of non-inferential knowledge are helpfully 
modelled on cases where a thinker has some evidence, sees what it supports, 
and judges that something is so in such a way that the facts that constitute 
the evidence constitute the thinker’s reasons for judging what she does. 
Because a thinker’s evidence just is her knowledge, we shouldn’t describe 
processes by which non-inferential knowledge is acquired as processes that 
take pieces of evidence as input and give us non-inferential knowledge as an 
output.7 
After I explain the key features of the disjunctivist approach to perceptual 
knowledge under discussion, I shall argue for two points. The first is that the 
disjunctivist cannot give us a suitable account of the reasons that support our 
perceptual belief. If the disjunctivist were right that such reasons were 
needed for knowledge or for justification, this would be an unfortunate 
result. Luckily, the claim that we need these reasons for justification and 
knowledge turns out to be unmotivated. Once you recognise that a belief’s 
justification turns on whether it constitutes knowledge, you should see that a 
belief’s justification doesn’t turn on whether the thinker’s reasons provide 
sufficient support for that belief. 
2. Two Ways to Stand in the Space of Reasons 
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According to McDowell (1998, 2002), knowledge is a standing in the space 
of reasons, in two senses: 
1. For McDowell, knowledge is a standing in the space of reasons in the 
sense that a thinker who believes what she does not know lacks standing. If 
she believed only what she knew to be true, she would have standing, but not 
if she doesn’t: 
Normativity of Knowledge: If S believes p without knowing p, she 
should not believe p.8 
The situation of the thinker who believes what she doesn’t know isn’t all that 
different from the situation of someone who is standing on property that they 
mistakenly believe is theirs. They try to exclude someone from it who they 
don’t realise has the authority to be there. It might seem that they have 
standing to exclude (at least, to people who don’t know where the property 
lines should be drawn), but they don’t. However good their reasons might be 
for believing they have this right, they lack the right to exclude. However 
reasonable they might generally be, there is a decisive reason for us to not 
assist them in trying to exclude others from this property. However 
reasonable our thinker might be, if she believes what she doesn’t know, there 
is a decisive reason for our thinker not to use their belief in theoretical 
reasoning as a tool for excluding or ruling out possibilities. Just as the right 
to property had better come with ancillary rights (e.g., the right to exclude, 
to use, to sell, etc.), the right to believe had better come with ancillary rights 
(e.g., the right to use that belief in deliberation). Once we know that the 
belief cannot be properly used to rule out possibilities, we know that the 
apparent right to believe is only that, no more. 
2. For McDowell, knowledge is a standing in the space of reasons in the 
sense that a thinker’s response (in this case, belief) attains the standing it 
does because it is backed by the thinker’s reasons: 
Knowledge-Reasons: If S knows that p, S’s being in a position to know 
supervenes upon the reasons she possesses, and her belief is properly 
based on sufficient reasons. 
One of the questions that I want to try to answer here concerns the relations 
between these two claims. Let’s suppose for the time being that knowledge 
is a standing in the space of reasons in the first sense. Should we say that 
knowledge is a standing in the space of reasons in this second sense? 
The first question is a question about motivation. Why should we accept 
that knowledge is a standing in the space of reasons in the second sense? 
Without the Knowledge-Reasons thesis, it isn’t at all clear why we should 
accept the version of epistemological disjunctivism under consideration. If 
we don’t need support from the thinker’s reasons for perceptual knowledge, 
we surely don’t need reasons that provide entailing support for our 
perceptual beliefs to be knowledge. And if we don’t need these entailing 
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reasons, we lose the epistemological motivation for accepting McDowell’s 
metaphysical disjunctivism. 
The second question is a question about the tenability of the proposal. Is 
there any reason to think that there are reasons that can do what McDowell 
wants them to do? Because he thinks knowledge is a standing in the space of 
reasons in two senses, he needs the thinker’s reasons to do two things. The 
thinker’s reasons have to ensure that the thinker’s response is appropriate or 
justified. In so doing, they have to ensure that the thinker is in a position to 
know. 
I don’t think that the proposed account is tenable or well motivated. I’ll 
explain why later in this chapter. Before I do that, I’ll need to explain why 
McDowell thinks that epistemological considerations support his 
metaphysical disjunctivist view. 
3. The Epistemological Argument for Metaphysical 
Disjunctivism 
Our epistemological disjunctivist thinks that in paradigmatic cases of 
perceptual knowledge, the thinker’s reason for believing p is that she sees 
that p. Because this reason is the thinker’s reason for believing p, the 
thinker’s reason provides factive support for her belief. Because it provides 
such support, the thinker’s reason is supposed to ensure that the thinker is in 
a position to know p. For this proposal to work, McDowell thinks that we 
need to embrace a relational and representational view of experience, one 
that’s incompatible with the traditional conception of experience that 
characterises experience as the factor that’s common to perception and 
indistinguishable hallucination. Otherwise, it is hard to see how perceptual 
experience could provide us with reasons that provide the required rational 
support. 
In combination, McDowell’s two commitments concerning knowledge 
imply that a thinker doesn’t have the right to believe what she doesn’t know 
and could only have this right if her beliefs were based on reasons the 
possession of which entailed that the thinker was in a position to know (and 
not merely in a position to justifiably believe where justification is 
understood as compatible with error). Most epistemologists would dismiss 
this kind of infallibilism out of hand. 
One reason most epistemologists reject this is that they see in McDowell’s 
infallibilism an impossibly easy route to scepticism: 
The strongest view one could take regarding the truth connection is that 
taken by Descartes. The Cartesian view is that justification logically 
entails truth. To put it schematically: It is a conceptual truth that, if 
conditions C justify belief B for subject S, then C logically entails that B 
is true. . . . The legacy of the Cartesian view is scepticism. Descartes 
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demonstrated this in the first meditation that no such connection is 
forthcoming. . . . Given any plausible specification of C for any S, it will 
always be logically consistent to suppose that not B. That is what the 
evil demon argument shows. Where, e.g., C comprises facts about 
sensory data, and where B is a belief about the truth of some empirical 
proposition, it is always logically possible that the evil demon has 
arranged for C to obtain where B is false. 
(Cohen 1984: 281) 
McDowell knows why this view is so gripping. People in the grips of it think 
that our best reasons leave it open whether our beliefs about the external 
world are true. Recall Conee’s argument for this kind of fallibilism: 
Suppose you have the belief that someone is speaking. You infer this 
from your justified belief that Mr. Jones is speaking. Thus, your external 
world belief that someone is speaking is a belief for which you have an 
entailing justification, your justified belief that Jones is speaking. 
However, it is quite plausible that your belief that Jones is speaking 
must itself be justified in order to justify any other belief. . . . When we 
consider candidate justifications for entailing justifiers like the belief 
that Jones is speaking, it becomes plain that at some point there is 
always a proposition that is justified without being entailed by its 
justification. In the present instance, the non-entailing justifier may well 
be your justification for the belief that Jones is speaking. This belief 
may be justified by the experience of its seeming to you that you hear 
what you seem to recall to be the sound of Jones’ voice. This experience 
does not necessitate that Jones, or anyone else, is speaking. But it may 
be all that you have, and all that you need, in favor of the belief that 
Jones is speaking. Exactly how this justification works is another matter. 
. . . [I]n any plausible view, at some point in the justification of each 
external world belief that is justified, there is justification without 
entailment. When this further assumption is added to the assumption 
that the entailment account is correct, we have a valid argument for the 
conclusion that no external world belief is well enough justified to be 
known. . . . The entailment claim is the argument’s least plausible 
assumption. So, if the skeptical conclusion is to be avoided, then the 
entailment account of the truth connection is the best candidate for 
rejection. 
(Conee 2004: 245)9 
Operating on the assumption that normative standing supervenes upon a 
thinker’s reasons, they conclude that since our best reasons are compatible 
with the falsity of most of our beliefs, the right to hold these beliefs cannot 
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turn on whether these beliefs are correct. As such, knowledge cannot be a 
standing in the space of reasons in the first or the second sense. 
McDowell thinks there are two mistakes in this reasoning. The first 
mistake is that of thinking that these fallible reasons might be adequate for 
positive standing. If these reasons really did leave it open whether our 
beliefs about the external world were correct, they couldn’t give us the right 
to believe what we do. (He rejects the hybrid view of knowledge that these 
philosophers assume is correct.) The second mistake is that of thinking that a 
suitable reconstruction of our epistemic situation and a correct description of 
our reasons for believing what we do could be things that ‘leave it open’ 
whether, say, there really is gin in this glass and smoke in the air. This leaves 
out facts like the fact that we see that there’s smoke in the air or that there is 
gin in the glass. They’re replaced by something else (e.g., experiences, sense 
data, facts about the inner, false propositions, etc.). 
This brings us to the second sense in which knowledge is for McDowell a 
standing in the space of reasons. A belief’s being knowledge is determined 
entirely by the thinker’s reasons. If a thinker’s reasons for believing p are 
sufficient in the normative sense (i.e., they make it the case that the thinker 
justifiably believes what she does), they must put the thinker in a position to 
know that p is true. Knowledge stands on supporting reasons that a thinker 
couldn’t have had unless they, too, were in a position to know. This seems to 
follow from something that McDowell and his critics mentioned earlier 
agree on, which is that normative statuses are determined by the reasons that 
the thinker has in her possession. They disagree about what a belief has to be 
like to attain this status (i.e., McDowell thinks that the belief has to 
constitute knowledge, and his critics cash out propriety in different terms), 
but they seem to agree that whatever status is, it is something a belief has by 
virtue of the reasons that a thinker has in her possession. 
Critics of this second idea are targets for McDowell’s criticism because 
they think of knowledge as a kind of hybrid. On this hybrid view of 
knowledge, having sufficient or adequate reason and having normative 
standing is one thing. Having an accurate belief and meeting whatever 
further conditions must be met for a belief to be knowledge is something 
further, something that a thinker might lack even if her reasons are perfectly 
adequate. McDowell rejects this hybrid view. He thinks that it suffers from a 
kind of incoherence: 
In the hybrid conception [of knowledge that allows that two subjects 
might both believe for adequate reasons but differ in what they know], a 
satisfactory standing in the space of reasons is only part of what 
knowledge is; truth is an extra requirement. So two subjects can be alike 
in respect of their satisfactoriness of their standing in the space of 
reasons, because only in her case is what she takes to be actually so. But 
if its being so is external to her operations in the space of reasons, how 
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can it not be outside the reach of her rational powers? And if it is outside 
the reach of her rational powers, how can its being so be the crucial 
element in the intelligible conception of her knowing that it is so? 
(1998: 403) 
If knowledge is then taken to be an epistemic standing, we fail to do justice 
to an internalist insight: 
[O]ne’s epistemic standing . . . cannot intelligibly be constituted, even in 
part, by matters blankly external to how it is with one subjectively. For 
how could such matters be other than beyond one’s ken? And how could 
matters beyond one’s ken many any difference to one’s epistemic 
standing? 
(1998: 390) 
If we turn the rhetorical questions into premises, we get our argument for the 
disjunctive conception of experience or appearance: 
The Epistemological Argument for Metaphysical Disjunctivism 
P1. If a complete description of your mental profile is neutral on 
whether p (where ‘p’ throughout will be a promising candidate for being 
an object of perceptual knowledge), the fact that p obtains or doesn’t 
obtain cannot be part of your perspective. 
P2. If the fact that p obtains or doesn’t obtain cannot be part of your 
perspective, the fact that p obtains or doesn’t obtain cannot be among 
the reasons that contribute to your epistemic standing. 
C1. So, if a complete description of your mental states and events is 
neutral on whether p, the fact that p obtaining or failing to cannot be 
among the reasons that make a difference to your epistemic standing 
with respect to p. 
P3. Knowledge is itself an epistemic standing. 
C2. So, if a complete description of your mental states and events is 
neutral on whether p, the fact that p obtaining or failing to cannot make 
a difference to what you know about p. 
P4. According to the traditional conception of experience, a 
complete description of your mental states and events is neutral on 
whether p. 
C3. So, if the traditional view of experience were correct, it implies 
that the fact that p obtaining or failing to cannot make a difference to 
what you know about p. 
P5. If the fact that p obtaining or failing to cannot make a difference 
to what you know about p, you cannot know whether p. 
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C4. So, if the traditional view of experience were correct, you 
cannot know whether p.10 
Someone who accepts the hybrid conception of knowledge will want to 
decouple the facts that can contribute to the subject’s epistemic standing by 
being reasons from the things that determine whether a subject’s beliefs 
constitute knowledge, but they can do this only by denying (P3). 
What would be wrong with denying (P3)? McDowell offers us these 
observations: 
What I claim yields no satisfactory conception of knowledge is the 
thought that truth-worthiness of endorsement, which is expressed by the 
attributor’s undertaking the relevant commitment herself-is needed as an 
extra condition, over and above whatever entitlement can be attributed 
to the candidate knower. This thought reflects the idea that entitlement 
incompatible with falsehood in what one is entitled to cannot be had. 
Thinking on these lines, one will suppose that if one does no more than 
attribute whatever entitlement one can, one leaves it open that what the 
putative knower putatively knows is not even true. In that case, she 
certainly does not know it. Given this interiorizing of entitlement, the 
fact that the putative knower’s commitment is to something that is in 
fact true . . . looks accidental in relation to the putative knower’s 
entitlement. 
(2002: 103) 
We start from the idea that one essential difference between mere true belief 
and knowledge is that the latter cannot be a relation between a thinker and a 
fact where it is at all accidental that the thinker is right in taking the fact to 
be a fact (Unger 1968). Suppose that the difference between being in the 
good case and the bad didn’t tell us what a subject’s reasons could be for 
believing p. If so, given the thinker’s best reasons for believing p, there is 
some element of luck and some degree of accidentality that distinguishes the 
subject in the good case from the bad. But this makes it hard to see what’s 
good about the good case. To be in the good case, the case of knowledge, 
we’re supposed to stand in some relation to a fact that shows that it is not at 
all an accident that we got things right. As we’ve just described the 
difference between the good case and the bad, it is to some extent lucky or 
accidental that the thinker who was moved by such and such set of reasons 
ended up with a true belief as opposed to a false one. So perhaps we have no 
right to describe the good case as good. It’s good to the extent that a thinker 
has a true belief, but perhaps it isn’t good in the intended sense. We cannot 
coherently describe it as a case of knowledge if good fortune is what brings 
the thinker and the fact together. 
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It’s reasonably clear why McDowell thinks that the hybrid view is 
problematic. On the hybrid view, a belief needs the support of reasons to be 
knowledge, but the support it provides leaves it open whether the target 
belief is knowledge. It seems incoherent, then, to say that positive standing 
is both ensured by the reasons and requires that the target belief constitutes 
knowledge. 
While most who defend the hybrid view of knowledge would respond by 
rejecting the idea that knowledge is a standing in the space of reasons in both 
of the senses discussed earlier, I would like to consider a slightly different 
response. I reject the hybrid view of knowledge because, like McDowell, I 
don’t think that a belief’s normative standing and its status as knowledge are 
separable. I disagree with McDowell because I deny that knowledge is a 
standing in the space of reasons in McDowell’s second sense. I reject the 
idea that the thinker’s reasons determine whether a thinker’s belief attains 
positive normative standing and that the reasons determine whether a 
thinker’s belief is knowledge. So, while I agree with McDowell that a belief 
attains positive normative standing iff it is known, neither positive normative 
standing nor knowledge is determined entirely by the thinker’s reasons. 
To see that there is room here for rejecting both the hybrid view and 
McDowell’s alternative, consider a view that combines the idea that 
knowledge is normative for belief with Williamson’s (2000) E=K. On this 
view, a belief’s positive normative standing turns on whether it is 
knowledge. In every case where a thinker knows, the thinker will have 
evidence or reasons that aren’t available to thinkers who do not know, 
however similar their situation and perspective might be. Where these views 
differ is that the knowledge-first view I’m envisaging says that non-
inferential beliefs constitute knowledge without the support of independently 
possessed reasons. McDowell needs to give us some further argument to rule 
this option out. If this option is left standing, it doesn’t seem we need 
epistemological disjunctivism to avoid external world scepticism. And if we 
don’t need epistemological disjunctivism to avoid scepticism, we don’t need 
metaphysical disjunctivism to explain how we can come to have the 
awesome reasons that the epistemological disjunctivist claims provides us 
with our perceptual knowledge. 
As I see it, there are two ways that McDowell might try to rule out this 
knowledge-first alternative. He might appeal to some conceptual truth about 
knowledge or some conceptual truth about positive normative standing. If he 
were to go the first route, he might try to show that nothing could be a state 
of knowledge unless it was adequately supported by independently 
possessed reasons. If he were to go the second route, he might try to show 
that nothing could be a rationally evaluable response that attains positive 
standing unless the thinker’s reasons guarantee that it can attain that 
standing. 
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We might see some signs of the first rationale in McDowell’s critique of 
the hybrid view. There is supposed to be some instability in that view 
because it seems to suggest that the conditions that help to turn a belief into 
knowledge might be conditions that aren’t ‘internal’ to the subject’s 
perspective on the world. Why is this problematic? It appears that it’s 
problematic because this suggests that there is some kind of good luck or 
fortune that helps to turn our beliefs into knowledge, but it’s hard to see how 
that status as a knower is one that we can come to have through good 
fortune. That seems right, but notice that this rationale works only if the 
thinker’s reasons play an essential role in the anti-luck condition on 
knowledge. I don’t see why they should. If someone has a safe basis for a 
belief, a complete description of that basis might not entail that the target 
proposition is true, but it seems strange to me to say that the thinker was 
lucky to get things right when basing her belief on a safe basis.11 Rather than 
explore this route further in this chapter, I will just focus on the idea that 
rationally evaluable responses can only attain positive normative status if 
supported by the thinker’s reasons.  
This assumption about normative status and the thinker’s reasons gives us 
the ancillary argument we need to rule out the knowledge-first alternative 
that I mentioned earlier: 
1. Belief is a rationally evaluable response. 
2. A rationally evaluable response can attain positive normative standing 
iff the thinker’s reasons must provide sufficient support (i.e., support 
that entails that the response can meet the relevant norms). 
3. Belief can attain positive normative standing iff it constitutes 
knowledge. 
C. So, belief can attain positive normative status iff the thinker’s 
reasons guarantee that the thinker is in a position to know the target 
proposition. 
The crucial premise in this argument is (2). With it in place, it’s easy to see 
why someone would think that the knowledge-first position I sketched as an 
alternative to McDowell’s is mistaken. Without it, it’s hard to see how the 
considerations that McDowell appeals to could force us to abandon this 
view. 
In the next section, I shall argue that perceptual experience will not 
provide us with the reasons that the epistemological disjunctivist claims we 
need to have perceptual knowledge. In the section that follows, I shall argue 
against the crucial premise of this argument. It cannot be true in general that 
positive status requires support from the thinker’s reasons. Thus, there are no 
sceptical costs to be paid by denying epistemological disjunctivism. 
11 Neither/Nor 
4. The Visual Basis of Knowledge 
According to the epistemological disjunctivist, the perceptual beliefs that the 
thinker forms in good cases are supported by reasons. Consider three 
candidate facts that could be the thinker’s reason for believing p: 
(a) That it appears that p. 
(b) That p. 
(c) That I see that p. 
It’s clear that (a) wouldn’t serve McDowell’s purposes. It’s too weak. It also 
seems to me to be a strange thing to propose if you think that perception is a 
source of reasons in the relevant sense. It seems that if all we get from 
perception when we see Agnes curled up on the couch is something like (a) 
is something that introspection provides us about perception. Perception 
itself seems to give us nothing further. McDowell rejects the idea that (b) 
could be the basis because he thinks that the transition from p to p couldn’t 
capture the thinker’s take on why they were convinced that p. This means 
that we’re left with (c), something that entails (b) and thus seems like a good 
candidate for playing the rational role that McDowell requires. 
The proposal differs from the knowledge-first approach sketched earlier 
because it identifies a reason that could be the thinker’s reason for forming 
her non-inferential perceptual beliefs. The fact that the thinker sees that p is 
an input to a process that takes non-knowledge in and spits perceptual 
knowledge out. (If E=K is correct, there can be no such process that takes 
reasons or evidence as input.) The possession of this reason and the ability to 
base beliefs on it cannot require that the thinker knows or believes (c), so the 
possession of (c) has to be understood in terms of the operation of perceptual 
capacities. Such capacities have to put us in a position to f for the reason 
that we see that p without believing p or that we see that p. This acquisition 
of a reason and being able to treat it as a reason has to be understood in 
terms of visual relations between the thinker and the things this thinker 
perceives. To introduce a bit of terminology, visualism is the view that a 
thinker seeing that p is a visual affair, a matter of a thinker standing in some 
perceptual relation to the fact that p.12 
Visualism isn’t my preferred view. I do not think that we stand in 
perceptual relations to facts. Even if we did, I do not think that there is any 
interesting epistemic status that supervenes upon the perceptual relations that 
we do stand in. I think that part of visualism’s spurious appeal is that the 
kind of report I used in stating the view is mistakenly assumed to report 
some visual relation that holds between a perceiver and that which the 
perceiver perceives. I think this is a mistake about language that helps to 
explain a mistake about perceptual consciousness. In keeping with 
epistemicism, I think that reports of the form ‘so and so sees that p’ report a 
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thinker’s knowledge, not perceptual relations that hold between a thinker 
and the things in her surroundings.13 If epistemicism is correct, it seems that 
the epistemological disjunctivist hasn’t given us any account of how we 
acquire perceptual knowledge. At the very least, it hasn’t identified the 
reason that could serve as an input into a process that takes non-knowledge 
in and spits non-inferential knowledge out. And since I’m operating on the 
assumption that this is what epistemological disjunctivism purports to do, I 
think that the truth of epistemicism shows that epistemological disjunctivism 
on its current formulation fails. The view would need to be reformulated, 
and I doubt that any such reformulation will provide the epistemological 
disjunctivist with what they need because, as we’ll see, we have non-
linguistic reasons to think that no visual relation between an individual and 
the things she sees could provide the thinker with reasons that would ensure 
that this individual was in a position to have a justified belief or knowledge. 
It’s all to the good that (c) entails (b). This means that (c) provides the 
factive support the epistemological disjunctivist thinks we need to know (b). 
One worry about visualism, though, is that (c) doesn’t seem to entail this: 
(a*) It visually appears that p. 
Consider, for example, ‘I see that the implications of consequentialism are at 
odds with many of our intuitive moral judgements’. It surely doesn’t follow 
from this that it visually appears that our intuitive judgements clash with this 
moral theory. Since (c) doesn’t seem to entail (a), I think we have some good 
reason to think that (c) isn’t really about perceptual relations between a 
thinker and the things that the thinker perceives. It certainly doesn’t identify 
the light in which the thinker comes to hold the perceptual beliefs that she 
does. If it did, it would contain the kind of information that (a*) does, 
information about how things perceptually appear and the things that would 
be made perceptually manifest when the thinker sees how things are.14 
If you think that all uses of ‘sees that’ are univocal, this might seem 
troubling. The visualists might say that there are purely perceptual uses of 
‘sees that’, uses that differ from those that don’t sustain the entailment from 
(c) to (a*). I still worry that the account will struggle to explain the fact that 
the alleged reports of perceptual relations aren’t extensional. Many 
uncontroversial perceptual reports are extensional. If I see Agnes and Agnes 
was the one who mixed the drinks, it just follows that I see the one who 
mixed the drinks even if I don’t think any drinks have been mixed. 
Epistemicism does a nice job handling linguistic data that alternative 
accounts struggle with, such as explaining why the ‘sees that’ reports are not 
extensional. Suppose Agnes sees Agatha and Agnes can see that this is 
Agatha. Suppose Agatha is the next person to order a martini. Agnes sees the 
next person to order a martini but it doesn’t follow that she can see that this 
is the next person to order a martini. Similarly, if Agatha’s drink is a martini 
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and both Agnes and Jack see it, it’s possible that Agnes sees that it’s a 
martini even if Jack cannot because, say, he is a lapdog, a child, or just 
doesn’t spend much time in bars. What we fill in for p in a report of ‘S sees 
that p’ depends, in part, upon the conceptual resources and abilities of the 
perceiver in a way that certain forms of awareness might not (e.g., the kind 
of simple seeing that’s common to Agnes’s and Jack’s seeing Agatha’s 
drink). 
If visualism is going to account for the fact that these reports are not 
extensional, they might try to offer us an account of ‘sees that’ that can 
account for this, one that appeals to the exercise of concepts: 
Visualism: When used perceptually, the report ‘S sees that a is F’ picks 
out a visual relation between S and the fact that a is F, one that ensures 
that the thinker is in a position to know that p perceptually. It does this, 
in part, by exercising the conceptual capacities necessary for 
representing something as being F.15 
What should we make of this account? 
There is some scepticism about the idea that facts are the right kinds of 
things to be the objects of perceptual awareness. Since it seems that 
visualism requires that facts be the objects of visual awareness, this seems 
like a serious problem for visualism and epistemological disjunctivism. 
Perhaps this scepticism is misplaced, though. Fish seems to think so: 
the basic constituents of presentational character are not objects and 
properties per se. Instead, . . . [we should say that] to see a property is to 
see it as inhering in some object or other. When we combine this with 
the thought that we never simply see an object but always see it by 
seeing one or more of the properties it possesses, it suggests a general 
theory of what the fundamental constituents of presentational character 
are. Take a given tract of the environment that I visually perceive. This 
tract of the environment contains an array of objects and surfaces that 
possess a vast assortment of properties. Given that, when we see an 
object in our environment, we don’t ‘just’ see that object, when we see 
an object what we see must be, at a minimum, that object’s bearing a 
property. Likewise, given that we always see a property as inhering in 
an object, when we see a property what we see must be, at a minimum, 
an object’s bearing that property. Taken together, these considerations 
suggest that the basic units that feature in presentational character are 
not properties and objects simpliciter, but rather object—property 
couples. 
(2009: 52)16 
If we think of facts as abstract, the scepticism about the very idea of 
perception relating us to facts seems well placed. If, however, we think of 
11 Neither/Nor 
facts as Fish’s facts, perhaps the scepticism is unwarranted. Let’s suppose for 
the time being that facts are Fish’s facts and consider whether perceptual 
relations to them could play the role that epistemological disjunctivism 
requires. Could we stand in purely perceptual relations to the fact that, say, 
this is a tomato or that this tomato is red and thereby be in a position to 
know such things? 
Visualism faces a serious objection, one that shows the advantages of 
epistemicism and, in turn, a knowledge-first approach to perceptual 
knowledge that tells us in advance that we shouldn’t hunt for a reason that 
provides us with the basis for our perceptual knowledge. The objection 
concerns the relationship between seeing that p and being in a position to 
know that p on the assumption that the former is truly a visual relation 
between a thinker and some Fish fact. Suppose you see a tomato under ideal 
viewing conditions. You’re in a museum. It’s on a plinth. The light is 
directed on it just like so. There’s an X for you to stand on and you’re 
standing on it with your head directed in the right way. There’s a sign that 
has ‘Tomato’ written on it in a sans serif font attached to the plinth. The 
tomato rests on a velvet pillow. Fill in the details so that it’s a clear case of 
simple seeing (i.e., seeing a tomato), epistemic seeing (i.e., seeing that it is a 
tomato), and knowing (i.e., knowing that the thing on the plinth is a tomato). 
According to visualism, its being a case of epistemic seeing is partially 
down to the fact that the understanding is operative and the tomato is 
represented as being one. The understanding is operative in the experience 
itself, not just in the judgement. It is also a matter of simple seeing, seeing a 
tomato. Had the understanding not been operative, the case would have been 
a case of simple seeing without epistemic seeing, but that’s not what’s 
happened. Because the tomato seen was represented as a tomato, it seems 
like as good a case of seeing that something is a tomato as anyone could 
hope for. And, as luck would have it, it’s a case of being in a position to 
know. 
Imagine a series of cases now where the viewer stands slightly farther 
away from the tomato so that at the last case in the series, a viewer sees a 
small speck from far off. And let’s suppose that each case has this much in 
common. The viewer sees a tomato, and the understanding that is operative 
in our first case is still operative in these latter cases in the same way so that 
the viewer believes on the basis of her experience that the thing she sees is a 
tomato and her experience represents the thing as a tomato. 
Just as we sometimes judge that something is an F from a great distance 
(perhaps too great a distance to judge reliably), there is no reason to think 
that the understanding that’s operative in experience (assuming with 
McDowell, that it is) wouldn’t sometimes represent the thing seen as being a 
tomato. Now, we have to ask two questions about this case of seeing a 
tomato at a distance. If the thinker believes that the tomato is a tomato, is 
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this correct belief knowledge? If the thinker’s experience represents it as 
being a tomato, is this a case of epistemic seeing? 
When we view things from too far off, the judgement that the thing on the 
plinth is a tomato might be correct, but its correctness should seem too 
fortuitous for the thinker’s perceptual belief to constitute knowledge. The 
interesting question is whether this is a case of epistemic seeing. Here is how 
I see the situation. If we imagine our series of cases as described earlier, the 
structure of such cases will look like this: 
[Note	to	author:	Tables	are	better	viewed	when	changing	your	
'MS	Word	settings'	to	'Web	view'].	
 
Great 
Distance 
Less Less Less Less Less Less Less On 
the X 
Simple 
Seeing 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Epistemic 
Seeing 
No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Position 
to Know 
No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
On this way of describing things, epistemic seeing correlates with being in 
a position to know, but not with simple seeing and the representation of the 
perceived object as a tomato. If we describe things this way, it seems that 
epistemicism explains why we shouldn’t describe the cases in which a 
thinker is standing far away as a case of simple seeing where the perceiver 
cannot see that the thing is a tomato. They cannot see that it is a tomato 
because they are not in a position to know. (They are not in a position to 
know, perhaps, because the basis for the correct judgement isn’t reliable or 
isn’t safe.) 
Now compare this visualism. Visualism says that this kind of explanation 
makes no sense. The things that explain why you’re not in a position to 
know do not explain why you don’t stand in some visual relation to the 
things perceived. It would seem that this case gives us a straightforward 
counterexample to visualism. It would seem that if epistemic seeing were a 
purely perceptual affair, simple seeing and epistemic seeing should correlate 
in just the way that they appear not to. 
Someone could, of course, contest this and say that simple and epistemic 
seeing do correlate: 
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Great 
Distance 
Less Less Less Less Less Less Less On 
the X 
Simple 
Seeing 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Epistemic 
Seeing 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Position 
to Know 
No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
If epistemic seeing, though, is understood as simple seeing in which the 
concept correctly categorises the object perceived, we vindicate the idea that 
epistemic seeing is indeed a perceptual affair at the cost of maintaining the 
connection between epistemic seeing and being in a position to know. On 
this approach (which I think is counterintuitive), visualism is spared from the 
objection, but it turns out that seeing that p doesn’t guarantee that the thinker 
is in a position to know p. In turn, this means that the epistemological 
disjunctivist’s proposal fails. Even if a thinker’s reason for f-ing is that they 
see that p, it doesn’t follow that they’re in a position to know p. 
This case generates a dilemma for the target view. On the one hand, if they 
were to acknowledge that one of our nine cases were a case of epistemic 
seeing without knowledge, they would have to acknowledge that it doesn’t 
follow from the fact that some thinker sees that the thing is a tomato that the 
thinker is in a position to know that it is one. On the other hand, if they were 
to deny that this is a case of epistemic seeing, they would need a credible 
explanation as to why this isn’t a case of epistemic seeing. I doubt that the 
visualists could offer a credible explanation as to why this would be. Why 
wouldn’t a case of simple seeing in which a tomato is correctly classified as 
such be a case of epistemic seeing? It is surely a matter of being visually 
aware of one of Fish’s facts if, say, the nearest case of simple and epistemic 
seeing is.17 
It’s obvious why the first horn is a horn. Our epistemological disjunctivist 
needs to identify some reason that could ensure that the thinker is in a 
position to know, and (c) was the only possible candidate for that. As for the 
second horn, I see no good way for the epistemological disjunctivist to 
tackle this given a commitment to visualism. They cannot deny that the 
understanding that is operative in the good case is operative in the bad one. 
The same conceptual capacities are deployed. It’s hard to see how there 
could be a difference in the visual relations because we’ve chosen our cases 
by screening out any case that isn’t a case of simple seeing. If they’re going 
to try to address the issue, they’ll need to show that any case where the 
thinker isn’t in a position to know that the thing is a tomato isn’t a case of 
seeing that it is a tomato without appeal to epistemicism. I see no good way 
for them to do that. The things that would that explain why we cannot know 
would seem to be modal considerations that explain why it wouldn’t be 
appropriate to deploy a concept (e.g., it could too easily be misapplied; it 
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would be applied even if the thing were not a tomato). It doesn’t seem that 
such points could figure in an explanation of what we see or what visual 
relations obtain between a viewer and things in her environment. 
5. The Thinker’s Reasons 
It’s hard to resist the pull towards visualism and the idea that we need such a 
view to explain how perceptual knowledge and justification is possible. It 
seems that such a view is needed because it seems, to some, that it’s 
impossible for any belief, inferential or non-inferential, to attain positive 
standing without being supported by reasons. 
It isn’t always clear why people believe that all belief exhibits this kind of 
dependence upon the support from the thinker’s reasons, but it is clear that 
many people do believe this. If they think that this reflects some important 
insight into the nature of normativity because, say, they believe that reasons 
always determine normative standing, the explanation as to why belief needs 
the support of reasons to attain positive standing might appeal to this more 
general thesis: 
Necessitarianism: The normative status of a thinker’s rationally 
evaluable responses supervenes upon the thinker’s reasons. 
I’d like to shift our focus slightly in this section to discuss necessitarianism 
because I think that it’s a commitment to necessitarianism that convinces 
people that the idea that knowledge is a standing in the space of reasons in 
the first sense (i.e., that a belief is justified iff it is knowledge) turns on 
whether it can be a standing in the space of reasons in the second sense (i.e., 
that a thinker’s reasons wholly determine whether a thinker’s belief 
constitutes knowledge). This necessitarianism seems to play a crucial role in 
the epistemological argument for metaphysical disjunctivism because it 
would explain why we should think that the possibility of perceptual 
knowledge requires that perception could provide us with these reasons that 
guarantee that any thinker with just these reasons would be in a position to 
know what we know in the good case.18 
Necessitarianism is mistaken. The case of non-inferential knowledge is a 
case in which a thinker believes something without that belief being based 
on one of the thinker’s reasons. Since the case of perceptual belief is a 
contested case, I’ll focus on other cases. Let’s take a step back to try to 
understand the motivation behind necessitarianism. 
Necessitarianism is appealing to people who think that normative reasons 
have to play a kind of guiding role: 
A familiar and intuitive thought is that normative reasons must be able 
to guide us. That is what reasons seem to be for. Considerations that 
cannot guide cannot do what reasons are supposed to do. To put the 
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same point differently, it is the job of a reason to recommend that a 
person perform a certain act or hold some attitude. If it is to do that job, 
the relevant person must be able to heed and respond to its 
recommendation. 
(Way and Whiting 2016: 214) 
The appeal of necessitarianism is completely mysterious if we reject this 
idea. If normative reasons don’t have to be suited to play a guiding role, it’s 
not at all clear why we would think that there’s any interesting relationship 
between the reasons that the thinker could be moved by and the normative 
status of the thinker’s rationally evaluable responses. On the other hand, if 
you think that normative reasons have to be able to play a guiding role, 
necessitarianism seems an attractive view.19 
Because of this connection between necessitarianism and the idea that 
normative reasons should guide us, let’s examine this thesis more closely: 
Guidance: A set of normative reasons can require an agent to f only if 
the agent is capable of being guided by these reasons in f-ing in the 
circumstances under which they are required (i.e., they can respond 
correctly on the basis of the right reasons in a way that shows that they 
are attuned to their demands).20 
In the case of perceptual belief, you might think that a thinker in the good 
case who sees that, say, the bird on the branch is a parrot either ought to 
believe that it is a parrot or, at the very least, ought not believe that it is a 
penguin. If these requirements require normative reasons, Guidance tells us 
that these reasons have to be reasons that the thinker is appropriately 
sensitive to so that they can be moved by them (and not merely in 
accordance with them) in such a way that the thinker’s rationally evaluable 
response is correct or appropriate. This couldn’t happen unless the normative 
reasons that generated the requirement were accessible to the thinker in such 
a way that those reasons could have been her reasons, so it seems that 
Guidance supports the idea that the reasons that matter are the thinker’s 
reasons understood as the reasons that could be the thinker’s reasons for 
responding as she does. 
If necessitarianism is mistaken because there can be cases where pairs of 
thinkers with the very same reasons are required to different things, the 
reasons that generate some of these requirements wouldn’t satisfy Guidance. 
If, however, the reasons that require the agent to f satisfy Guidance, it would 
seem that the connection between these reasons and the justification or 
propriety of the relevant response couldn’t be contingent. Thus, it would 
seem that arguments for Guidance should support necessitarianism and 
objections to Guidance should undermine our confidence in 
necessitarianism. 
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One concern with Guidance is that it seems to conflict with intuitive 
verdicts about cases. To see this, we’ll shift our focus away from cases of 
perceptual belief to a case of inferential belief. 
Agnes has a very reliable breathalyser, one that she knows never fails to 
detect drunkenness when a driver is drunk. In only 5% of the cases in which 
a driver is sober will her breathalyser falsely say that the sober driver is 
drunk. She also is aware that 1 driver in 1000 will be drunk. Agnes 
administers the test and it indicates that the driver just stopped at the 
checkpoint is drunk. She’s now very confident that the driver is very drunk. 
She has a credence of .95. That is where Agnes is, and you know how she 
got there. You know what she knows and how she has responded. Is this how 
she should have responded? Should she have a different credence? 
It would seem that Agnes’s options would include this credence along 
with the mathematically kosher credence (roughly .02) and scores more that 
would not impress your statistics professor. Here is my concern. Suppose 
that Agnes ought to have some credence or other. The ones that are not 
mathematically kosher (i.e., her actual credence and those that are not 
roughly .02) would not seem to be correct responses to her situation. The 
available reasons do not support this credence. If all the options but the 
mathematically kosher credence are incorrect responses to the available 
reasons, a ‘No Dilemma’ constraint tells us that she ought to have the 
mathematically correct credence for the simple reason that we have 
eliminated all the other alternatives to this one on the grounds that they are 
not correct responses to the available reasons. So, we have an argument that 
this response is mandatory. This response cannot be mandatory, however, 
because this response is not one that meets an attunement condition (i.e., the 
subject doesn’t meet the conditions necessary for being guided appropriately 
by the reasons in the way spelled out in Guidance). Agnes cannot respond in 
the mathematically kosher way while, say, manifesting her competence if 
that is understood as her know-how to respond correctly to the reasons. 
If this final response is not required, some other response must be 
permitted. But those seem to be ruled out because they fail to meet the 
condition that says that it’s proper to f only if the available reasons support 
that. There might be an alternative to Agnes’s unwarrantedly high credence 
where Agnes suspends, withdraws, or just does not take account of the 
evidence presented to her. If this, however, is the only permitted option left 
on the table, it is mandatory. The problem is now that this withdrawing 
response is also one that would fail to meet the attunement condition. So, 
according to Guidance, it could not be mandatory. So it would seem that 
there is no feasible response that involves responding correctly to the 
normative reasons while basing that response on reasons that provide 
sufficient support for that response. If, as it seems, Guidance clashes with 
the intuitive judgement that Agnes shouldn’t be confident and should 
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suspend judgement, Guidance clashes with intuition and doesn’t provide 
support for necessitarianism. 
There is a kind of structural defect in views that incorporate the 
attunement conditions. The introduction of such a condition threatens to 
screen out the requirements generated by the reasons that screen out the 
incorrect responses but must leave us at least one permitted response if 
reasons don’t generate dilemmas. What larger lessons can be drawn from 
this? We should be sceptical of appeals to intuitions about guidance, for a 
start. Recall the quotation from the opening. The suggestion was that the 
normative reasons should satisfy certain conditions to be good normative 
reasons: they have to be such that they can guide creatures like us. Getting 
the ‘can’ right here is tricky, but on a very demanding reading of ‘can’, this 
is a deeply disturbing picture. Shouldn’t the idea be that we should be such 
that we are guided to do, believe, and feel what the reasons require from us? 
If we’re fully aware of the reasons but moved in the wrong way, isn’t the 
fault in us? 
As it happens, I think that it’s important for the epistemological 
disjunctivist to reject Guidance. Think about the bad case. According to the 
epistemological disjunctivist, the thinker’s lacking sufficient reason to 
believe that things are as they appear means that they cannot justifiably 
believe p when it appears that p. If they shouldn’t believe this, there is a 
decisive reason for them not to. Can it guide them? It couldn’t guide them if 
they don’t know that such a reason applies to them. We have to reject 
negative introspection and acknowledge that their failure to be in a position 
to know is something that they’re not in a position to know in the bad case. 
If the reason for them not to believe is decisive in this case (much in the way 
that the reason not to draw the inference is decisive in the case presented 
earlier), the winning reason isn’t one that can guide the thinker. Again, we 
have to ask why we should think that the propriety of a response depends 
upon whether the thinker bases that response on the sufficient reason there is 
to respond this way. If the epistemological disjunctivist builds Guidance into 
their framework, they have to abandon this idea that the thinker in the bad 
case shouldn’t believe because they have to abandon the idea that the thinker 
has a decisive reason not to believe what she does not know. 
6. Why Is the Good Case Better? 
Let’s return to this question about the relationship between Normativity of 
Knowledge and Knowledge-Reasons. There are at least three ways in which 
things are better in the good case: 
1. The good case is better than the bad because the thinker’s reasons for 
believing p are better in the good than in the bad. 
2. The good case is better in the sense that the belief that p is justified. 
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3. The good case is better in the sense that the thinker knows p. 
I agree with McDowell that the hybrid view of knowledge is mistaken and 
that it’s a mistake to say, as most epistemologists do, that (2) is false on the 
grounds that the reasons we have in the bad case are good enough to show 
that the beliefs formed in that case are justified. Like McDowell, I think that 
(2) and (3) are correct. Our disagreement concerns (1). 
As I would explain (2), (2) is true because (3) is.21 If people insist on 
using the language of reasons, I would say this: because ‘ought’ implies 
‘reason’ and (2) implies that the thinker should not believe p. This reason is 
decisive. This just follows from (3) and the idea that knowledge is the norm 
of belief, the idea that knowledge is a standing in the space of reasons in the 
first sense. Since I reject that all such standings are determined by the 
thinker’s reasons, I see no need to appeal to (1) to explain (2) or (3). The 
explanation of (2) goes no farther than an appeal to (3). 
In stating his epistemological case for metaphysical disjunctivism, 
McDowell claims that the difference between the good case and the bad 
cannot be external to the subject’s perspective on things. In a way, the view 
offered respects that. The thinker who knows is aware of something that the 
thinker in the bad case is not—to know p is to be aware of the fact that p, 
and without such knowledge we don’t have such awareness. 
To rule out this shallow knowledge-first explanation of (2), McDowell 
would need to show that (2) requires (1). I don’t think that it’s a general truth 
that the propriety of a response requires access to the normative reasons that 
determine the status of our potential responses. The case of the fallacious 
inference seems to suggest that a thinker ought to suspend judgement when 
she’s out of her depth even when she’s in no position to appreciate that this 
is so. We find something similar happens in the bad case where a thinker 
hallucinates. The thinker has, according to McDowell, a decisive reason not 
to believe p. The thinker has no access to the reasons in light of which this is 
so. So even McDowell has to agree, given his commitment to (2) and (3), 
that some rationally evaluable responses can be proper or required even 
when the thinker cannot base her response on the reasons that determine the 
response’s normative status. That is to say, even McDowell has to deny 
Guidance. Without some reason to think that belief is different from 
suspension of judgement in that proper belief always requires being based on 
reasons that provide sufficient support, there is little reason to think that our 
commitment to the Normativity of Knowledge should incline us towards 
Knowledge-Reasons. 
Since I lack the imagination to invent further arguments for the mistaken 
view that all justified beliefs are justified because of the support provided by 
the thinker’s reasons, I should stop here. Neither epistemological 
disjunctivism nor a suitably matched metaphysical disjunctivism is 
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necessary for accounting for the justification of perceptual belief. Hence the 
title.22 
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1 See McDowell (1998), Pritchard (2012). McDowell’s views have evolved, and the 
criticisms of epistemological disjunctivism discussed here do not apply 
straightforwardly to his new views. See McDowell (2009) for details. It is not 
clear whether his new views concerning the objects of visual awareness sit well 
with the epistemological assumptions operative in the epistemological 
arguments for disjunctivism discussed in this chapter. My target is not 
McDowell, but an idea about the rational role of visual contact with things in 
our surroundings that is inspired by McDowell (1998). 
2 McDowell (1998) thinks that we need both forms of disjunctivism to avoid 
scepticism, but Pritchard (2012) is agnostic about metaphysical disjunctivism. 
For a helpful discussion, see Byrne and Logue (2009). 
3 For further discussion of the connection, see Schmidt (2018). 
4 Although Cohen (1984), Conee (2004), and Conee and Feldman (2008) all find this 
objectionable. 
5 See Littlejohn (2017) and McGinn (2012) for arguments that our perceptual beliefs 
are not based on the thinker’s reasons. 
6 Some philosophers like to say that experience is a source of evidence or a source of 
reasons. There is a kernel of truth in this idea. Experience is a source of 
knowledge, so it must be a source of evidence. I don’t think we should also say 
that experience is a source of evidence in the sense that it provides an evidential 
basis for knowledge. The process by which we acquire knowledge is the process 
by which we acquire evidence. These are not two processes, but one process 
under two descriptions. 
7 Although the idea that cases of perceptual knowledge and/or justified perceptual 
belief are cases in which there is something that is the thinker’s reason for 
believing what she does is popular, it is hard to find arguments for this claim. 
For accounts of perceptual knowledge and/or justified belief where reasons 
and/or evidence play a central role, see McDowell (1998), Siegel (2010), 
Ginsborg (2011), Pritchard (2012), Logue (2014), Schellenberg (2014, 2018), 
Schroeder (forthcoming). For criticism of this idea, see Brewer (2011), McGinn 
(2012), Travis (2013), French (2016), Littlejohn (2017). 
8 In addition to McDowell, see Sutton (2007), Littlejohn (2013), Williamson 
(forthcoming). 
9 Infallibilism is often taken to be a sceptical view, but see Dutant (2016), McDowell 
(1998), Williamson (2000) for helpful perspective on the (alleged) sceptical 
consequences of infallibilism. 
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10 This reconstruction draws on van Cleve’s (2004) exegetical work. 
11 For defence of a safety condition as an anti-luck condition, see Luper (1984), Sosa 
(1999), Williamson (2000). 
12 Prominent visualists include McDowell (1998), McGinn (1999), Ginsborg (2011), 
Turri (2010), and Pritchard (2012). The visualists that I have in mind think the 
fact that p is seen when we see that p. For a helpful discussion of what it might 
mean to be visually aware of facts, see Longworth (2018). For an interesting 
alternative proposal about reasons and the objects of visual awareness, see 
Logue (2014), Cunningham (2018). 
13 Williamson (2000), French (2012). One source of confusion about visualism and 
epistemicism is that some authors seem to conflate the question, ‘Does 
perceiving require knowing?’ with a linguistic question about reports or 
attributions that use ‘sees’ and related verbs. Epistemicism does not tell us that 
propositional knowledge is necessary for perception. It tells us only that ‘S sees 
that p’ functions to attribute propositional knowledge. Since this is a claim 
about language, arguments for visualism and/or against epistemicism that 
appeal to psychological claims (e.g., perceiving does not require belief or 
knowledge) miss the point. 
14 For further arguments that these reports of epistemic seeing do not report 
perceptual relations between an individual and the facts, see Travis (2013). 
15 I suspect that visualism is largely responsible for the (mistaken) belief that fake 
barn cases show that it’s possible to have reasons or evidence that aren’t things 
that we know. For the use of such examples to argue that the thinker’s reasons 
for f-ing needn’t be things the agent knows see, for example, Hughes (2014), 
Locke (2015). For responses to the use of such cases to criticise knowledge 
accounts of the possession of reasons, see Carter (2013), Littlejohn (2014). 
16 The objection to a visualist view that takes perceptual contact with Fish’s facts to 
be sufficient for being in a position to know should apply, inter alia, to views 
that take the relata of perceptual consciousness to include objects and 
properties. Even if perceptual consciousness relates us to objects and properties 
and has some kind of intuitional content because of the exercise of conceptual 
capacities, the case described in this section suggests that there can be pairs of 
cases with the same object, same properties, and same intuitional content where 
the perceptions differ with respect to whether they put the thinker in a position 
to know that the object in question has the relevant properties. 
17 In this argument, the operative idea of being in a position to know is (roughly) the 
idea that you would know if you were to believe given the way of coming to 
believe available to you. Someone might try to blunt the force of the objection 
by adopting a slightly different conception of being in a position to know, one 
that says that a thinker is in a position to know by basing her belief on a reason 
R when the thinker would come to know by basing her belief on R provided that 
there are no defeaters. If, as someone might naturally think, there are defeaters 
here that defeat knowledge if you believe that there is a tomato on the plinth, 
the visualist can preserve the idea that there is a perceptual relation that’s 
sufficient for being in a position to know. I don’t think that this proposal will 
suit the needs of someone like McDowell because it introduces something that 
is necessary for knowledge that is independent from the reason that you’d be 
aware of perceptually. This would, in turn, result in a hybrid picture of 
knowledge according to which the difference between knowing and failing to 
know would be ‘extrinsic’ to perceptual consciousness (i.e., the 
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presence/absence of the knowledge defeater would not supervene upon the 
awareness of the reason R). But McDowell rejects this hybrid picture, and the 
rejection of the hybrid picture is the essential idea in his argument for 
metaphysical disjunctivism. If we’re allowed to adopt a hybrid view of 
knowledge where a belief’s status as knowledge doesn’t supervene upon facts 
about the thinker’s total reasons and the reasons on which her belief is based, 
we lose all motivation for thinking that the relevant reason has to be something 
the awareness of which is sufficient for all the things packed into my 
conception of being in a position to know. Thanks to Joe Milburn for raising the 
issue. I think it’s an important one, and one that I had overlooked previously. 
18 Necessitarianism supports the idea that a perceptual belief is justified only if it is 
based on a sufficient reason. Suppose Agnes forms the perceptual belief that 
this is a tomato on the basis of her experience. Suppose she comes to know that 
this is a tomato. If Agnes’s belief was justified without being supported by 
reasons to believe this proposition, there wouldn’t be a difference in the support 
she had for believing this or for believing that it is not a tomato. To account for 
the fact that the cases where Agnes has justification to believe it is a tomato are 
never cases where she has justification to believe that it is not, the necessitarian 
wants to say that her reasons support one without supporting the other. It 
doesn’t seem they can account for this without insisting that the justification to 
believe one thing rather than the other requires the possession of reasons that 
provide sufficient support for one and not the other. 
19 Joe Milburn wanted to know what connection, if any, there was between 
necessitarianism and Guidance. Might the necessitarian try to motivate their 
view without any appeal to Guidance? I think so. As Milburn reminded me, 
they might appeal to some sort of reasons-first view and/or the arguments for 
such a view. On this view, normative reasons wholly determine the normative 
status of any rationally evaluable response. I have no objections to the reasons-
first idea, per se, but we should note that the reasons-first view might not be 
well suited for the epistemological disjunctivist. Many reasons-first 
philosophers (e.g., Kiesewetter 2017; Lord 2018) think that the reasons that 
determine what we ought to believe, feel, and do are always accessible to the 
agent. (Part of their reason for thinking this is that they accept Guidance, but 
they could reject Guidance and accept the accessibility constraint.) But, as I’ve 
argued here, the epistemological disjunctivist has to reject this idea since they 
have to acknowledge that there are decisive reasons for us not to believe that 
are not accessible to the agent. If reasons-first philosophers were to relax the 
access requirement on normative reasons, their views might seem to be 
compatible with epistemological disjunctivism; but then it’s not clear why in 
this framework we would need to have a rational basis for perceptual beliefs 
constituted by reasons of the kind that McDowell and Pritchard think are 
necessary for perceptual knowledge. 
20 Kiesewetter (2017) and Lord (2018) appeal to the idea that normative reasons are 
supposed to be able to guide us to objections to the idea that rationality consists 
in responding correctly to reasons. One of the aims of Littlejohn (2012) was to 
argue that there are no norms that could provide us with such reasons since, in 
principle, there is no interesting application condition that we could not in 
principle be misled about. If all potential application conditions are things that 
we can rationally but mistakenly believe to obtain (or rationally but mistakenly 
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believe not to obtain), it would seem that Guidance would have to be mistaken. 
For similar sceptical arguments against Guidance, see Srinivasan (2015). 
21 In Littlejohn (2012), I also argued that something close to (1) explains why the 
good case is better. There I argued that the good case is better because the bad 
case is worse. It is worse because that is a case where there is a decisive reason 
not to believe, one that is provided by the fact that the thinker violates a norm. 
(There is no such reason not to believe in the good case because there is no 
norm violated in that case.) But the difference in reasons not to believe differs 
from the difference in the quality of the reasons to believe. I think the right 
explanation will accentuate the negative, not the positive, and focus on the 
presence/absence of reasons not to believe rather than the presence/absence of 
reasons to believe. This is not an explanation that is available to the 
disjunctivist. 
22 I would like to thank Casey Doyle and Joe Milburn for helpful feedback on a 
previous draft. I would also like to thank Maria Alvarez, Bill Brewer, Adam 
Carter, Christina Dietz, Julien Dutant, Craig French, John Hawthorne, Nick 
Hughes, Dustin Locke, Guy Longworth, Errol Lord, Susanne Mantel, David 
Papineau, Susanna Schellenberg, Eva Schmidt, Matthew Soteriou, and Charles 
Travis for discussing these issues with me. 
